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4The Howard Goodman Fellowship was established in memory of
the architect Howard Goodman and to build upon his dedication
to rationalising the provision of good quality healthcare
buildings equitably for the whole of the National Health Service.
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The Howard
Goodman Fellowship
Howard Goodman, who died in 19991, joined the
South Western Regional Hospital Board of the
newborn NHS in 1949. Developing a national
health service from the patchwork of very diverse
existing organisations and facilities was an
unprecedented task. For its first decade there
were hardly any resources available for new
buildings – or even for much-needed
improvements to the existing stock – a period of
austerity characterised by the World War II motto
“make-do-and-mend”. 
This situation changed in 1960 with a rapid
increase in the capital available for hospital
building. The Ministry of Health engaged a group
of the ablest young architects with healthcare
knowledge, experience and enthusiasm to
develop the Hospital Building Programme under
the new Chief Architect, William Tatton-Brown.
Goodman, after a period designing hospitals in
private architectural practices, was one of the
leading members of Tatton-Brown’s 
Development Group.
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At the Ministry, Goodman played a central
and inspiring role in a distinguished
multidisciplinary team researching hospital
design and designing a comprehensive and
equitable system of service planning,
building design, cost control and
procurement. As his success and
reputation in this grew, his responsibilities
widened. In 1971 he succeeded Tatton-
Brown as Chief Architect, subsequently
filling the post as Director of Development
and Health Building in the enlarged
Department of Health and Social Security.
Goodman and his team are recognised for
many achievements. Among the most
outstanding were the research and
development for the new Greenwich
District Hospital2 in southeast London
(1969), the ‘Best Buy’ hospital, the
‘Harness’ system3 (1970-73), the ‘Nucleus’
Hospital4 (1974) and the initiation of the
research programme and construction of
two low energy hospitals5, 6 (St Mary’s, Isle
of Wight in 1990 and Wansbeck,
Northumberland in 1993). All these projects
embodied many important innovations in
master-planning, dimensional co-
ordination, departmental design and
building as well as environmental
engineering technology. 
Under Goodman’s leadership these
innovations were properly researched and
tested and this deeper knowledge was
diffused co-operatively and applied
throughout the NHS. As a result, Britain
became the world leader in healthcare
architecture and our ideas and systems
were emulated in many countries overseas.
Following Goodman’s death, Professor Ray
Moss, founder of the Medical Architecture
Research Unit (and a long-time colleague
at the Ministry and the Department of
Health and Social Security), set out to raise
funds for research that could rekindle
interest in Goodman’s work during a new
era of healthcare building. With strong
support from the Nuffield Trust and
Architects for Health7, of which Goodman
and Moss had been founding members
and well-known active participants, Moss
obtained contributions from NHS Estates
(Department of Health), two NHS hospital
trusts and leading firms in the building
industry and professions. This enabled the
funding of a three-year research project, to
be based at Imperial College London,
following discussions with Professor Sir
Leszek Borysiewicz, then Principal of the
Faculty of Medicine. 
By 2004 the reform of the NHS and the
introduction in 1992 of the Private Finance
Initiative for capital projects in the public
sector were beginning to transform the
original processes, established and refined
over some 30 years, for developing
healthcare buildings8. A dramatic
programme of new hospital developments
was in progress9 and a number of large
projects had already been completed.
These presented an immediate opportunity
for research case studies. 
With regular advice from the Steering
Committee, the research was conducted in
two phases between October 2004 and
March 2006, and between January 2007
and September 2008.
1. Noble, A. ‘Howard Goodman 1928-
1999’. Hospital Development,
June 1999, pp. 9-12.
2. Goodman, H. ‘Greenwich District
Hospital. An exercise in logistics.’
Hospital Management, Planning
and Equipment, London, October
1966 pp. 574 - 577.
3. Webber, C. And Moss, R. ‘Harness’.
Health and Social Services
Journal, 18 August 1973,
pp1866-1867.
4. Department of Health and Social
Security, Nucleus Designers
Handbook, second edition, 1986
5. Low Energy Study
Team/Department of Health and
Social Security. DHSS Low Energy
Study Report, January 1982.
Department of Health and Social
Security
6. Department of Health and Social
Security. The Second Low Energy
Hospital Study Report, London,
HMSO, 1987
7. www.architectsforhealth.com
8. HM Treasury (2000) Taskforce,
Technote 7: How to achieve
Design Quality in PFI Projects,
para 2.15.
9. National Health Service. The NHS
Plan. A Plan for Investment, a
Plan for Reform. London, HMSO,
2000
Notes
6Introduction
Howard Goodman’s career in
healthcare architecture began with
the formation of the NHS in 1949 and
ended as Director of Development and
Health Building in the Department of
Health and Social Security in the
1970s. His work was key in helping to
create a comprehensive and equitable
system of health service planning,
building design, cost control and
procurement. The achievements of
Howard Goodman and his team
include a series of innovative hospital
designs embodying innovations in
master-planning, building design 
and construction.
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However, by the late 1990s, the need for rapid modernisation
of NHS infrastructure had become evident and a dramatic
programme of new hospital development was in progress.
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was rapidly changing ways
of developing healthcare facilities.
The overall aim of the research was to explore the 
relationship between PFI, as a delivery mechanism for
healthcare infrastructure, and its potential to accommodate
future changing needs, especially through flexibility and
adaptability in the built form. 
This work shows that we need to learn from the experience 
of developing new hospitals under the PFI model. But 
perhaps more important is learning from history. In this 
report we therefore situate the experience of hospital design
and construction in the historical legacy of Goodman and 
his colleagues.
8Context
The context for the research
project was set by three
broad interacting influences.
First was the original
intention to build upon the
aims and substantial
achievements of Howard
Goodman’s work for the NHS
by developing independent
research on the design of
future healthcare buildings. 
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In the process of setting up the Fellowship, a number of
topics for investigation were identified in discussion with
the key sponsors and other experts in the field.
These included the changed hospital planning and design
procedures affected by the procurement methods, the
impaired communications between users and designers
and the neglect of consideration both for the future
adaptation of facilities and for innovation and change.
The 1962 Hospital Building Programme 10 had, during the
preceding three decades, shown how innovation could be
achieved and there was a developing interest in exploring
the contemporary experience in new hospital
developments. The reform of the NHS had led to the
dissolution of the trained and experienced multidisciplinary
teams at the Department of Health and in the Regional
Health Authorities. These had provided the whole of the
NHS with a system of strategic planning based on
assessment and equitable provision according to health
need. Departmental and whole hospital operational
policies were tested and recommended standards for
spaces, services and equipment were set; guidance on
functional design and reducing operating costs was
provided; a system of dimensional co-ordination and
performance standards for basic building elements and
components was introduced together with a system of
continuously monitored and up-to-date cost control for
procurement.
The multidisciplinary teams at the health department had,
in co-operation with teams in the regions, also initiated
innovative research and development, testing them on
pilot projects. As this system for creating and maintaining
the NHS infrastructure was being rapidly replaced by
untested alternatives such as PFI and LIFT, there was a
strongly felt need to assess the effects of the changes on
healthcare building design.
The second influence on the research was the
contemporary scene in the NHS. Some five years had
elapsed from the inception of the Fellowship, following
Goodman’s death in 1999, to the start of the research at
Imperial College London in 2004. The reforms of the NHS
were altering both policies and personnel throughout the
service. Profound changes are continuing into the present
especially in response to dramatic crises in national and
global economies. At the same time, developments in
healthcare technologies have enabled new approaches to
care delivery, increasingly shifting services from acute
hospitals to the community. The type of infrastructure
needed to support healthcare has also been evolving. 
And, thirdly, the rapidly expanding construction and reform
programme in the UK has presented extensive
opportunities for the independent sector, especially USA-
based architects and healthcare corporations, to supply
infrastructure and services to the NHS.
Clearly, the research took place at a time of massive
upheaval. For healthcare planners, architects and the
construction industry the most immediate change was the
introduction of the PFI which had made possible a
programme of major new hospital building for the NHS.
Inevitably, the PFI became a central element in the research.
The establishment of the Health and Care Infrastructure
Research and Innovation Centre (HaCIRIC) in 2006 – a
collaboration between Imperial College London and
Loughborough, Reading and Salford Universities with
funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council – provided the Howard Goodman
Fellowship with related knowledge and expertise. Lessons
from the Fellowship research have now been taken up in
other HaCIRIC projects.
10. Cmnd. 1604, National Health Service. A
Hospital Plan for England and Wales,
London HMSO, 1962.
Notes
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The research
The overall aim of the research was to
explore the relationship between the
PFI delivery mechanism for healthcare
infrastructure and the potential to
accommodate future changing needs,
especially through flexibility and
adaptability in the built form.
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‘Adaptability’ was defined as the facility to
accommodate changes of use or function,
which result in the need to alter the building
and its services physically or organisationally.
The research adopted a qualitative method
focusing on case studies of selected 
hospital projects. 
The first stage involved developing knowledge
of the background both at a national and case
study level and included a survey of a random
sample of 52 senior representatives from PFI
and LIFT consortia (26 responded) and
informal interviews with 10 experts in the field
from the Department of Health, NHS Estates,
contractors, architects, and legal practitioners
and consultants involved in PFI. From this
background research two groups of hospitals
were selected for case studies – hospitals
completed using the pre-PFI funding and
delivery model and hospitals planned and built
via the first wave of PFI schemes.
Next, short case studies were undertaken of
the first group of hospitals11. These comprised
informal interviews with healthcare architects
and planners, visits to the hospitals and
evaluations of the projects’ background
documents, where these were available.
This phase was followed by detailed case
studies of the second group of six hospitals12.
The planning, delivery and operation processes
of the six projects were explored through 33
semi-structured interviews with key
stakeholders, visits to the hospitals and
analyses of background documents13. 
Interviewees comprised hospital trust project
directors and clinical planners, special purpose
vehicle (SPV) company managers, building
contractors’ managers, facilities management
services managers and architects. A further
eight representatives from the contemporary
PFI projects were interviewed individually or
participated in group discussions in October
2007 and April 2008.
In the final stage the preliminary research
findings were presented to the research
advisory group (comprising experts from
healthcare architecture and construction) and
at a workshop which included other academic
researchers and 45 representatives from health
policy, health services and the construction
supply chain. The completed research,
together with discussion of the results and
conclusions, has now been published in a
number of academic papers14 and presented
at conferences.
3.1
Background
Communication and collaboration between trust,
SPV and subcontractors difficult and disrupted
because of the contractual arrangements 
The trust was not seen (by the SPV) 
as the client but rather as an impediment.
... Relationships among all parties 
were quite aggressive because of 
the underlying investment vehicle and 
the tight construction budget 
and timeframe.
Our contract was with the SPV so we were
not supposed to talk directly to the users,
but we talked to them anyway. The
relationship between the contractor, the
client and us became very fragile. We and
the client got along very well but the
contractor was a barrier between us.
‘
Project director Healthcare architect
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In a PFI project the main contract is
between the hospital trust and the special
purpose vehicle (SPV)15. In the case studies
it was found that the presence of the SPV
established barriers to ready
communication between the hospital
operational system and the project delivery
system. The PFI model had not led to more
collaborative ways of working. Architects
felt they had to serve two ‘clients’, the SPV
as well as their traditional client, the
hospital and its users. 
In several cases the SPV was wary of
overly close relationships between the
trusts’ healthcare planners and the
architects. In only one of the PFI cases
studies was the SPV described as
providing a supporting role and aiding
communication. In the other cases
communication was found to be difficult
and detrimental to collaboration in planning
and delivering the project. The research
also found problems between NHS trusts
and project subcontractors because of the
contractual intervention of the SPV.
3.2
Key findings
There are four key findings from the research. Three of them - a tendency to poor project
communication, risk aversion and overly tight control of capital spending – suggest serious
issues in the PFI process that may diminish innovation for each project. The fourth, relating
to general sharing of knowledge, raises concerns about how much learning from PFI leads
to information on innovations being spread beyond the particular project. The team also
found a general, but debilitating issue of a conservative ‘public sector mentality’ that can
also be found beyond PFI projects.
3.2.1
BARRIERS IN COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN ARCHITECTS AND HOSPITALS
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Risk, incentives and 
innovative solutions 
‘
Project director
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PFI stifles innovative solutions. 
Investors and financers are not 
interested in innovation; they do not 
want to take risk.
‘
Director, architects’ practice
We achieved a reasonable design with 
regard to flexibility. This was probably 
more despite PFI since there is a strong
focus on initial capital cost. The SPV takes
the view: “Why spend the money if we
cannot recoup this investment?”
‘It’s a game to bring the business case 
down to get approval from the Department.
This results in an unrealistic budget, 
which doesn’t allow for the implementation
of innovative ideas.
SPV Project director
3.2.2
RISK AVERSION REDUCED
ADOPTION OF INNOVATION
The main goal for the NHS is a facility
delivering healthcare to its patients,
whereas for the providers of private finance
a hospital project is mainly seen as an
investment vehicle. This mismatch causes
more cautious attitudes to risks associated
with innovations. Risk aversion is the result
of three factors – the competitive bidding
environment, the PFI funders’ need to
protect their investment and the trusts’
need to transfer risk to the private sector.
There was a tension between the potential
for promoting innovation at the bidding
stage (seen as an important ‘sales’
advantage) and the risk averse attitude that
prevailed within PFI consortia. PFI consortia
bidding against each other were unwilling to
offer more than the minimum necessary to
meet a brief containing statements about
the need for unspecified adaptability. 
It was felt that, as design was carried out
concurrently with tendering, opportunities
for innovation under PFI were very limited.
Private sector funders exert pressure to
protect their return on investment and
tender to reduce risk by using conventional
designs and construction methods.
There were a number of examples of
advantageous innovations that required
derogation from current, often out-of-date,
NHS guidance. Derogation takes time and
resources and adds risks for those who are
tendering. Prescriptive NHS guidance
focuses mainly on technical objectives with
measurable targets but does not include
any detailed requirements for infrastructure
adaptability. The research found that it is a
disincentive for the SPV to introduce
adaptability partly because the rewards
would only benefit the trust and partly
because additional income could be
achieved through making future alterations
at the hospital.
3.2.3
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND
LEARNING FROM PFI PROJECTS 
IS LIMITED
Learning from the experience of carrying
out a succession of projects can lead to
effective development of new innovative
ideas. Hospital PFI projects are generally
large, one-off developments, a
characteristic that potentially weakens
each trust’s ability to learn. Systematic
capture of experience on PFI projects by
hospital trusts is largely absent.
Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge
between trusts was found to be very
limited. As a result of this lack of
disseminated learning, inexperienced
trusts may compile inadequate 
design briefs.
All private sector partners reported that
they used various strategies to learn from
their completed PFI schemes. However,
the competitive environment ensured that
their experiences typically remained within
individual firms, with only some sharing
within the PFI consortium.
Transfer of knowledge – 
within and between
projects
Healthcare director, architects’ practice
The transfer of knowledge between
individual trusts is very limited. The
knowledge resides within the consortia
and architects.
‘
‘
‘
‘
‘
11. Greenwich District Hospital;
Northwick Park Hospital; West
Suffolk Hospital; Guy’s and St.
Thomas’ Hospital; Homerton
Hospital; St. Mary’s Hospital, Isle of
Wight.
12. Confidential under the terms of the
research agreement with the case
studies.
13. See page 16 for questions explored
in case study interviews.
14. Barlow, J., Köberle-Gaiser, M.,
Delivering innovation in hospital
construction. Contracts and
collaboration in the UK’s Private
Finance Initiative hospitals
program. California Management
Review 51(2), pp.126-143.
Barlow, J., Köberle-Gaiser, M., The
private finance initiative, project
form and design innovation,
Research Policy 37 (2008), pp.
1392-1402.
15. A “Special Purpose Vehicle” is a
company or consortium formed to
provide finance, design,
construction and maintenance for a
specific project.
3.3
Research conclusions 
and recommendations
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3.2.4
CAPITAL COSTS AND
CONSERVATIVE MENTALITY
HINDER INNOVATION
Another factor impeding innovation was the
need to reduce capital costs to match the
approved affordability limits established by
the ‘public sector comparator’. These limits
were considered to be unrealistically low in
several cases. Although not explored in the
case studies, the payment-by-results
mechanism for generating NHS hospitals’
revenues does not allow for the high
availability charges incurred through PFI
projects. Because of these limits to
affordability, innovation and measures for
future adaptability could not be included in
PFI projects.
A ‘public sector mentality’ which prevents
NHS stakeholders from taking initiatives
‘outside the box’ was also considered a
hindrance to innovation. Reorganisations 
of the NHS stifled ‘the focus on the 
future’ even further; NHS culture was 
found to be short term, concentrating on
‘fulfilling today’s needs’, rather than
thinking long-term.
After examining a group of projects, it was
found that the PFI model may have been
less effective in stimulating design
innovation than the system it replaced.
While by no means perfect, it enabled
greater coordination between the project
development and health service operational
systems throughout the NHS. Increasing
the role of the private sector in the delivery
of infrastructure projects had not provided
the innovation benefits expected through
adopting this model.
The selected cases studied were all early
examples of PFI hospital projects. Later
projects may have improved innovation
outcomes, although interviews on a
contemporary project suggested this may
not have been the case.
The main structural problem – separation
of the project supply side (the private
sector consortium) and the operational
services delivered through the NHS –
remains unresolved.
The research concluded with the proposal
that policy makers should incentivise
industry to deliver innovation. Future
delivery models based on public-private
partnerships should include incentive
mechanisms for the partners to consider
quality and efficiency improvements in the
hospital’s care outcomes. This should be
far more effective in encouraging the
innovative potential of the private sector in
providing healthcare infrastructure.
NotesHospital trusts also 
hinder innovation
(The trust management) are content 
to get a new building and don’t think
about redesigning the process first ...
Buildings are built for the current 
working practices.
Healthcare director, architects’ practice 
Trust director of nursing
‘The (SPV) would like five years’ advanced
notice (of requirements), but this is not
NHS culture. It is short-term, fulfilling
today’s needs.
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The PFI model may have
been less effective in
stimulating design
innovation than the 
system it replaced. That
system involved greater 
co-ordination throughout
the NHS.
‘
‘
1. INTERVIEWEE’S INVOLVEMENT:
• What was the interviewee’s role during the delivery
process?
• What is his/her role now?
2. NEED FOR NEW FACILITY:
• What were the reasons for the new hospital?
• How was healthcare provided before this facility
existed? 
3. CHOICE OF PROCUREMENT METHOD:
• Which procurement mechanism was chosen?
• Why was this mechanism considered to be the
best choice?
• What was the determining factor for choosing one
bidder over another? 
• What level of importance had the design and the
consideration for flexibility in the decision for the
successful bidder?
4. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FLEXIBILITY 
DURING THE PLANNING PHASE:
• Was flexibility to accommodate future change a
concern during planning phase? 
• To what extent were operational running cost a
consideration during the planning phase? 
• What was the planning horizon of the people
involved?
• Who of the stakeholder was the most interested in
flexibility?
• Were there any incentives to consider and to plan
for flexibility? 
16
Research questions
Topics discussed in the semi-structured
open-ended interviews included
considerations for flexibility during the
planning phase, implemented strategies
for flexibility, changes since completion,
and the implications of the financing and
procurement process for adaptability
and innovation.
Adaptability and innovation in healthcare facilities
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5. IMPLEMENTED STRATEGIES 
FOR FLEXIBILITY:
• Does the hospital provide potential for changes 
in the future?
• Does the facility allow for sharing one room
between different (clinical) disciplines? 
• How easily can the function of one room be
changed? 
• How easily can an entire area be changed in order
to accommodate new care delivery models and/or
technological changes? 
• How easily can departments grow and shrink? 
• Does the facility provide the potential to expand and
to contract? 
• Does the facility provide the potential for a 
non-hospital use?
• Is there a strategy for the change of building 
elements in place?
• Is there a strategy for the change of engineering
services in place?
• How realistically is change achievable 
considering feasibility and the level of disruption 
on the operation?
6. CHANGES SINCE COMPLETION:
• Which physical aspects have been changed since
completion? 
• What were the reasons for these changes?
• How easily were these changes implemented? 
• Which of the changes have been foreseen during
the planning phase and which have been
unforeseen?
• Which of the measures for flexibility worked to
accommodate these changes and which not?
• Did the building prevent necessary changes?
7. INNOVATION:
• Are there any parts/features of the hospital that 
you consider ‘innovative’ (especially with regard to 
future flexibility)?
• How did these innovations come about?
8. PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND FLEXIBILITY:
• Did the contractual arrangements provide a climate
for creative ideas and innovative solutions for future
flexibility?
• What was the attitude towards risk for innovative
solutions among the different parties involved?
• Do the contractual arrangements allow changes
easily to be made to the physical structure during
the operational phase?
• Is there a case to build a PFI hospital with a
contract that includes all service provisions
(provision of facility, FM services and clinical
services)?
• What would have been different to the current
building and its delivery process?
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The National Health Service’s desire to foster innovation in
its healthcare infrastructure has been manifest in policy
documents throughout its history. The ambition of the
government was clear in arguing that PFI is “much more
than a new hospital building programme....It has to become
the principal mechanism for getting new design solutions
into the NHS”16.
So the conclusions of this research paper may cause some
disappointment. The research has found that most, if not
all, of the stakeholders interviewed were open to innovative
proposals. However, the nature of PFI tended to raise rather
than reduce barriers to new thinking. Risk-aversion tended
to increase, difficulties arose due to non-compliance with
existing NHS guidance, there were financial disincentives to
adaptability and unduly low cost limits on projects. These
sat alongside resistance to change, springing from a
conservative ‘public sector mentality’, problems related to
NHS re-organisation as well as short-term thinking within
the health service.
Commentary04
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4.1
Lessons from the past
www.haciric.org 
Despite the shortcomings of the PFI, the
desire and ambition to nurture innovation is
clear. What lessons, then, can now be learned
to make this vision a reality, so that innovation
is genuinely achieved and more widely
adopted in the future? This commentary
argues that experience from the 1950s and
1960s offers signposts about how better to
measure and share innovation, as well as
guidance on the type of institutions that could
ensure continuing knowledge development
and transfer in the field of healthcare
infrastructure development.
Looking back at the post-war period, it is
apparent that the successful capture and
dissemination of new ideas required
forethought and planning. In part, this was
achieved via opportunities that sprang out of
adversity. Gradual economic recovery from the
war meant that the new health service was
established for more than a decade before the
long overdue hospital building programme
could be afforded. 
This lengthy delay in construction offered
planners time for a reflection. During the ten
year hiatus after the foundation of the NHS,
Studies in the Function and Design of
Hospitals17 was published by the Nuffield Trust.
It made available an outstanding body of
research and development and – most
importantly – impeccable research
methodology. This work – and the Nuffield
research team that carried it out – became the
foundation for the programme embarked upon
by the architects at the Ministry of Health and
also of the Medical Architecture Research Unit
(MARU) which was established in 1964.
The Nuffield approach was simply and clearly
expressed in the introduction to the Studies as
‘a balanced relationship’ between ‘the
accumulated knowledge and experience of
those whose daily work has been within the
hospital or in hospital design’ and the input of
‘fresh minds and methods from outside’.
The drive to think anew also came from the
scale of the enterprise eventually undertaken.
Howard Goodman and his colleagues were
obliged to innovate if they were to deliver the
unprecedented national hospital building
programme introduced in 1962, based upon
assessment of the population’s medical needs.
Fortunately, they kept their heads, learning in a
systematic way from both their successes and
their mistakes. 
Different initiatives were researched, piloted
and openly exposed to professional
assessment before being adapted for wider
application in the NHS. Each successive
initiative - each innovation - built upon the
experience of its predecessors. As a result,
healthcare building in the UK developed
positively for several decades and was
acknowledged as leading the world in its field. 
Beginning with the innovative 1962 ‘Hospital
Plan’, design and process innovations were
introduced such as Departmental Guidance
Notes, CUBITH (Coordinated Use of Building
Industrial Technology for Hospitals), and MDB
(Manufacturers Data Base), as well as
innovative hospital designs - Greenwich
District Hospital, ‘Best Buy Hospital’, the
‘Harness’ system, the ‘Nucleus’ hospital, and
Low Energy Hospitals. Achieved in an
extraordinarily productive and innovative
period, this series may be seen as a growing
tree of development.
In summary, innovations arose from the
combination of experience in the field and
fresh ideas from outside and they were
introduced widely only after changes had been
demonstrated to be improvements. The lesson
of all this for those wishing to nurture effective
innovation today is that we also need to think
ahead about capturing and disseminating
learning. We must create a system to ensure
that initiatives are researched, piloted 
and critically examined by experts before being
more widely employed.
‘Each successive initiative
built upon the experience
of its predecessors.
‘
4.2
Measuring and 
evaluating innovation
4.3
Flexibility and
adaptability 
in the built form
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These lessons, however, raise further
questions. Measuring and evaluating
innovation requires understanding about
where its real value lies. One source of
value, written into countless NHS design
briefs, has been the need to design
hospitals to accommodate adaptability or
flexibility for possible future change in use.
In the 1955 Nuffield Studies there is a brief
discussion of flexibility, the seed for what
developed into Nuffield’s authors’ ‘growth-
and-change’ theory of hospital design 18.
This approach was intensively researched
and developed, culminating in the design
for Northwick Park Hospital 19. This line of
development in hospital design focused
very effectively on growth as the generator
of change. Unfortunately, closer
examination of adaptability or flexibility –
while still required in NHS design briefs –
received limited attention.
However, the architects in Goodman’s team
within the the health department did carry
out and commission a number of studies,
for example on operating department
utilisation, exploring differing use patterns
within a given layout. MARU made a study
of outpatient accommodation using
mathematical models relating the number
of rooms (‘string length’) to demand 20. 
This paper influenced the design of the
outpatients’ department at Greenwich
District Hospital where combinations of
differing strings of interconnecting
consulting and examination rooms proved
effective as patterns of demand and usage
changed over the life of the hospital. The
design of Greenwich piloted a number of
innovations, providing flexibility for
significant internal rearrangement to ease
the pressures for growth on a restricted
inner-city site.
This understanding of flexibility has atrophied
subsequently. It was difficult to identify
examples of flexibility in the PFI case studies.
In mitigation, it should be added that some
of the case study projects had only very
recently been completed when the research
was carried out. So it would have been hard
to distinguish significant changes in use
since completion from operational activities
that were still adjusting to the new hospital. 
Additionally, the research highlights the
general absence of an existing body of
organised data and serious analysis of
actual adaptability and flexibility in NHS
hospitals, a deficiency that pre-dates PFI.
Nevertheless, the systemic problems
already highlighted around innovation within
PFI do appear to be a factor in the shortage
of detail about flexibility in these schemes. 
Clearly, then, there is a need for more
sophisticated research in this field. We must
understand what ‘flexibility and adaptability
in the built form’ amounts to and how, in
new buildings, we can recognise ‘the
potential to accommodate future changing
needs’. This is a tricky area. How, precisely,
can ‘potential’ be identified ahead of the
future? How can it be assessed or
measured for a specific project?
Experience from the 1960s and 1970s
suggests some options. It may, for example,
be possible to identify potential adaptability
through drawing board exercises. Non-
loadbearing internal partitions have long
been an automatic choice in all types of
modern buildings; these were even
discussed in the Nuffield Studies. In any
given interior a variety of hypothetical layouts
can be planned with demountable partitions.
An illuminating example of a drawing board
exercise was the pioneering and highly
innovative Community Health Centre for the
Greater London Council’s new town at
Thamesmead (1972)21. Before approval was
given to the health centre’s design, the
architects were required to demonstrate
how the built form could be adapted
satisfactorily for future use as a public library.
Another way to identify potential adaptability
is to apply knowledge derived from
comparing a range of actual adaptations
with their original built forms. In October
2006, ‘Architects for Health’ issued
members with a brief pro forma on which
they could indicate examples known to
them of realised adaptability and flexibility. A
small number were offered but it was
insufficient for significant follow-up and
analysis. The resources to derive deeper
knowledge of actual adaptations were not
available within this research project. Now
may be the time to put more resources into
such work and produce some clear
guidelines for future projects.
‘Now may be the time 
to produce some clear
guidelines for future
projects.
‘The architects in
Goodman’s team carried
out and commissioned a
number of studies.
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There are also questions about the contexts
that are required to develop learning in this
field. Experience from the post-war period
suggests that a pre-requisite of success is
a coherent policy that respects the
synthesis between structure and
infrastructure upon which to base 
strategic planning.
On a practical level, research in healthcare
design should be multidisciplinary. Teams
should include experienced, representative
medical and care professionals as well as
design and construction professionals. Their
expertise should combine effectively to
analyse the changing structure and
infrastructure requirements for healthcare
and to develop the strategic planning.
The benefits that can be achieved from this
can be seen from the research presented in
the 1955 Nuffield Studies. This work was of
substantial value to the developing NHS
and an outstanding achievement both in
itself and in what flowed from it. The
Nuffield team went on to advise the Ministry
of Health and to provide advanced training
for its architects entering the field of
hospital design. The strength and value of
the research-based knowledge became the
foundation for the work of Tatton-Brown
and Goodman at the the health
department, and of MARU.
In this period, professionals across the field
cooperated wholeheartedly in research and
development, unconstrained by
considerations of competitive market
policies and commercial confidentiality. For
example, the Hospital Design Unit at the
the health department, the South East
Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board,
MARU and the King’s Fund together
published in detail their researches for the
Greenwich Hospital project. 22
Subsequently, Richard Llewelyn Davies,
who directed the Nuffield team, set up a
powerful research base at the Bartlett
School of Architecture, University College
London, and also, in partnership with his
Nuffield colleague John Weeks, established
a leading private practice carrying out 
major hospital and other projects in which
their research-based innovations would 
be implemented.
More broadly, the institutional structure for
planning and delivering healthcare facilities
has changed fundamentally since the
1960s and 1970s. The old model of
strategic planning by the UK central
government department - plus
implementation by regional and area
authorities - no longer applies. Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland now have 
their own health services; in England there
are 10 Strategic Health Authorities that
guide, regulate and monitor the business
cases of a variety of separate trusts for
hospitals, primary care and other elements
of the NHS. 
There is no longer an effective body of
established and experienced multi-
disciplinary planning and design
professionals at the Department of Health
with the resources to carry out research
and development of infrastructure for
innovative services. 
Research in healthcare design in academic
institutions has become piecemeal and
poorly-resourced, as a result of the NHS,
the major sponsor of such work, no longer
demanding this learning. Academic
research in this field has latterly relied upon
opinion surveys and anecdotes, or else has
combed medical literature for connections
between medical outcomes and the
designed environment. Before it was finally
dissolved, NHS Estates was no longer in a
position to publish the type of guidance that
could really meet all the needs of
professionals involved in PFI projects.
‘Multidisciplinary teams
should analyse
requirements for
healthcare and develop
strategic planning.
‘
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The situation today in some ways
resembles the problems that existed
immediately prior to the setting up of the
new hospital building teams at the Ministry
of Health and the Regional Hospital Boards
in 1960. 
The Howard Goodman research project
has provided an opportunity to appreciate
the achievement of these teams in
organising ab initio the infrastructure for the
new nationwide healthcare system. That
achievement offers important insights into
the research that is now needed, focused
on infrastructure design, to examine and
define more precisely what ‘adaptability’
and ‘flexibility’ in built form entails and how
the service requirement may be specified.
A systematic field study of actual examples
would require very significant resources but
a well-researched analysis would help to fill
a major gap in our understanding.
Such a development would take place in a
context that may be less expansive than in
Howard Goodman’s day. There are
considerable constraints on new investment
in NHS infrastructure as a result of
pressure on public and private sector
finances. There are still a considerable
number of projects already proceeding that
will become operational in the next few
years, but it is unlikely that major new
projects will be approved in the foreseeable
future. So, more concern will be given to
conserving and maximising the use of
existing infrastructure. This will certainly
include necessary adaptation of spaces
and services to changing needs as they
arise, with exploration of options for re-
planning and re-equipping existing facilities.
The issues that today’s planners face are
also different. The impact and timing of
global climate change will be difficult to
anticipate at the local level. There will be
continuing - and almost certainly
accelerating - pressure on energy supplies
and costs. Additionally the control of
healthcare associated infection will require
new practices and new designs.
For architects and others involved in
healthcare design this context will affect
the nature of the designing they are asked
to carry out. These could include a majority
of much smaller projects involving
adaptations and conversions, energy
conservation and sustainability measures
applied to existing infrastructure as well as
accommodating health services to cope
with disasters and strategies for safely
handling epidemics.
Nevertheless, despite the difference of the
contexts, today’s planners face many
issues of methodology that Howard
Goodman and his colleagues grappled
with so successfully half a century ago.
Today’s government and its healthcare
planners would do well to heed the lessons
of the relatively recent past. 
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Experience from the 1950s
and 1960s offers signposts
about how to measure and
share innovation as well as
guidance on institutions that
could ensure continued
knowledge development.
‘
‘
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